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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
FORFEITURE OF PAYMENTS UNDER A LAND PURCHASE
CONTRACT IN MONTANA
In many parts of the country long-term installment contracts are re-
placing purchase-money mortgages as the most popular method for financ-
ing sales of real estate on credit.' The traditional protections available to a
mortgagor under a purchase-money mortgage have not been extended to
purchasers under long-term installment contracts. For a concrete example,
let us suppose a typical land purchase contract situation.! The purchaser of
a $10,000.00 house has agreed to pay $2,000.00 down from his savings and
to make monthly payments of $75.00. In addition, he has agreed to pay
taxes of $100.00 per year and the yearly premium of $20.00 on the insur-
ance. Suppose that at the end of three years this purchaser loses his em-
ployment and defaults in his payments. Thirty days after default he re-
ceives notice to vacate. Unlike a tenant under a lease, during the three
years he has kept house and grounds in repair, paid $360.00 for taxes and
insurance, expended $200.00 for improvements on the house and $800.00
in building a garage. These amounts total $6060.00 without counting pay-
ments and efforts for upkeep, repairs and utilities. Ile will now lose his
home and the expenditures made upon it. The fair rental value of the
property being $85.00 per month, the vendor has the right to receive
$3,060.00 for the period, which still leaves a net gain to the vendor of
$3,000.00. Should he be permitted to keep this $3,000.00 windfall at the
expense of the buyer? In other words, should a vendor be entitled under a
land purchase contract to retain money paid, without regard to damages
sustained, upon default of the purchaser ?
Concerning this problem Professor Williston has stated :"
Few questions in the law have given rise to more discussion
and difference of opinion than that concerning the right of one
who has materially broken his contract without legal excuse to re-
cover for such benefits as he may have conferred on the other party
by part performance ... two fundamental legal policies seem here
to come into conflict. On the one hand, it seems a violation of the
terms of the contract to allow a plaintiff in default to recover....
On the other band, to deny recovery often gives the defendant
more than fair compensation for the injury he has sustained and
imposes a forfeiture upon the plaintiff . . . but the second of these
opposing policies has increased in favor in recent years. Except
where the obliquity of the defective performance is of a sort that
indicates moral obliquity, and where, therefore, the courts feel that
the one who is in default may properly be penalized, the tendency
is to grant him restitution if a substantial net benefit has accrued
to the defendant by partial performance.
Even though there is a tendency toward greater liberality as indicated
by Professor Williston, the fact remains that the majority of American
jurisdictions refuse to allow the defaulting purchaser to recover any of
'N.Y. Law Revision Commission, Act, Recommendation and Study Relating to In-
8tatln~t Land Contracts 343-385 (1937).
2Bodenheimer, Forfeitures Under Real Estate Installment Con-tracts in Utah., 3 UTAH
L. REv. 30 (1952).
85 WILTSTON, CONTACTS § 1473 (Rev. ed. 1938).
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his payments or the value of the improvements.' This position has been
criticized by nearly every legal writer in the field" Prompted in part by
the "instinctive revolt against making the vendor more than whole,"' a
strong minority of jurisdictions deny the right of the vendor to retain, as
forfeited, -money paid on the contract in excess of the damages actually suf-
fered from the breach.' The American Law Institute favors the position of
the minority in its Restatement of Contracts, where relief for the default-
ing purchaser is advocated.8
At least sixteen states have enacted legislation of various types in an
effort to secure for the purchaser a more equitable adjustment of his
rights. A recent commentator speaking of the status of such legislation
said that in no state is the interest of the defaulting purchaser adequately
protected by legislation." In New York, in 1937, a well drafted bill to pre-
vent inequitable forfeitures and to regulate in general the rights of pur-
chasers under installment land contracts failed to pass the legislature.'
Montana has a statute which authorizes general relief against for-
feitures.' By the adoption of this and other sections' Montana would seem
'5 CoRBIN, CONiRACTS §§ 1075, 1129 (1941) ; 3 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 791 (Rev. ed.
1938) ; McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 153 (1935). In England and Canada the rule is
diffeient. 3 WILIstON, CONTRACTS § 791 (Rev. ed. 1938).
'Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to RestitutioU of Installments Paid, 40
YALE L. J. 1013 (1931) ; Ballentine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L.
REv. 329 (1921) ; Venneman, Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts, 14 MINx. L. REV.
342 (1930) ; Pound, The Progress of the Lair, Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1920) ;
Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Converiol by Contract: II,
44 YALE L.J. 777 (1935).
6Dooley v. Stillson, 46 R.I. 332, 128 Atl. 2,17, 52 A.L.R. 1501 (1921).
'Annot., 31 A.L.R. 2d 19 (1951).
'RESTATEMNT, CONTRACTS § 357 (1932), permits restitution to a plaintiff in default
under a contract if his part performance has resulted in a net benefit to the de-
fendant, provided that the breach of contract was not "willful and deliberate." A
breach due to financial hardship or error of judgment is not considered willful and
deliberate.
'N.Y. Law Revision Commission, op. cit. supra note 1, at 385.
"ONote, Installnent Land Contracts: Legislative Protection of Defaulting Purchaser,
52 HAzV. L. REv. 129 (1938).
"Ibid., containing a general evaluation of the proposed New York legislation. It
provides for rescission by the vendor upon the purchaser's default, but with a grace
of thirty days, and of six months in case the purchaser has made improvements on
the land; but on the expiration of such period, the purchaser's equity of redemption
is foreclosed, and the vendor may take possession, with the added right of damages
for breach of the contract. But in estimating the venor's damages, the purchaser
is credited with payments previously made on account of the purchase, and also
with payments, if any, made pursuant to assessments for public improvements. The
provisions of this proposed legislation indirectly serve as commentary on the suf-
ficiency of the law as it now exists. This is especially true in view of the extensive
study conducted by the New York Law Revision Commission. N.Y. Law Revision
Commission, op. cit. supra note 1.
"RVmSED CoDES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 17-102: "Whenever, by the terms of an obliga-
tion, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by
reason of his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom,
upon making full compensation to the other party, except in the case of a grossly
negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty." (Hereinafter the REVISED CODES
OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.) California and North Dakota have enacted the same
provision. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3275 (1951) ; N. D. REV. CODE § 32-0112 (1943).
'It might be well to note here that Montana and California have identical Code sec-
tions dealing generally with this matter. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 13-804, 13-805, 17-102,
17-208, 17-306, and 17-307, correspond with CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1670, 1671, 3275, 3294,
3306, and 3307 (1941), respectively.
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to have declared a legislative preference for the second of the two opposing
policies Professor Williston mentions above.' The statute has, however,
been so strictly construed by the Montana Supreme Court as to make it
virtually ineffective.' Thus, in order to obtain relief from forfeiture under
the statute, one must plead and prove facts which appeal to the conscience
of a court of equity and prove that such default was not grossly negligent,
willful, or fraudulent.' Although that rule may be justified, its applica-
tion has been so questionable in some cases to make a mockery of "con-
science" and "equity." In Estabrook v. Sonstelie financial inability to
perform due to circumstances beyond the vendee's control was not deemed
suffiicent to "appeal to the conscience of a court of equity."' Likewise, in
Pratt v. Daniels-Jones Co. the fact that the failure to pay an installment
when due was through mere inadvertence was not considered sufficient to
avoid forfeiture under the statute.
In contrast, there have been a number of cases in which the statute
was invoked as the basis upon which forfeiture was denied. In Huston v.
Vollenweider' it was held that where the vendee withheld payments under
the erroneous belief that the vendor had breached the contract, the ques-
tion of whether there had been a breach being fairly debatable, a sufficient
showing was made to "appeal to the conscience of a court of equity." The
court allowed the vendee to recover the excess, if any, of the amount of
payments made over the fair rental value of the premises during the period
of occupancy. in Williams v. Hefner" the vendee withheld the payment of
an installment when due because of an erroneous belief -that the vendor
would be unable to deliver a marketable title. The questions regarding the
title were fairly debatable. Although the time for paying the installment
was made of the essence and had passed, the court relied upon the statute
under consideration in allowing the vendee a reasonable time to tender the
balance of the purchase price and complete the sale. The latest pronounce-
ment by the court concerning the application of the statute was in Herman
v. Herman.' It reiterated the requirement for the showing of "facts ap-
pealing to the conscience of a court of equity." It was then held that the
vendee was entitled to recover an installment paid when the vendor allowed
"4See text at note 3 8upra, wherein the second policy is stated to be the one opposed
to giving the defendant more than fair compensation for the injury he has sustained
and imposing a forfeiture upon the plaintiff.
15REsTATSfMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 357 (1940) (Montana Annotations) ; Note, op. cit. supra
note 10.
"Friedrichsen v. Cobb, 84 Mont. 238, 275 Pac. 267 (1928). The defaulting vendee
could not recover in suit for amount paid under the contract where he did not offer
to pay the rental value of the premises during the period of occupancy, nor allege
that defendant could be given back his property, value undiminished. The vendee's
right to rescind was held waived by failure to surrender the property. He had paid
$13,628 of the $27,000 price and held possession for seven years.
"86 Mont. 435, 284 Pac. 147 (1930). The vendee in possession was held to have
waived the right to rescind for misrepresentation where ten years of uncomplaining
possession had been shown. The vendee had paid $18,500 on the price of $25,000
and the vendor was thus allowed to retain $13,600 more than he had been damaged.
'847 Mont. 487, 133 Pac. 700 (1913). The vendee paid $637.00 on price of $6,370.00
plus interest at 6% and taxes. He was in possession of the property for one year.
"101 Mont. 156, 53 Pac. 112 (1935).
"89 Mont. 361, 297 Pac. 492 (1931).
2123 Mont. 39, 207 P.2d 1155 (1949).
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the vendee to be in default a number of years without demanding payment
or giving notice of cancellation, and thereafter conveyed the land to an-
other. Thus, although the court relieved against a forfeiture, it did so
through an application of the test which led to the grossly inequitable re-
sult reached in the Sonstelie case. Also, that case was one of those cited and
relied upon as authority for the holding. Therefore, it would appear that
if the court were confronted again with facts similar to those of the Sonstelie
case a result similar 'to that arrived at would follow.
Other statutes have either been considered only cursorily or lightly
disregarded in Montana. Thus, a code provision invalidating contracts for
forfeiture of property subject to a lien in satisfaction of the obligation se-
cured thereby, and all contracts in restraint of the right of redemption,"
was held to have no application to land purchase contracts because the
vendor has title and therefore no lien.' Another statute,' providing that
liquidated damage provisions are void, was circumvented by saying that
the provision being void, the parties are left where they would have been
had no such stipulation been made. ' On the other hand, the Montana
Supreme Court has held that although payments made may be retained, the
vendor may not recover for past due installments, thus impliedly recogniz-
ing the inequities of the situation. '
The early leading Montana cases' relied upon the New York case of
Lawrence v. Miller ' as authority for allowing the forfeiture of payments
under a land purchase contract. The forfeiture concept developed in that
case has been totally unsatisfactory, however, as is demonstrated by the
proposed legislation in New York and the Revision Commission's report
thereon. ' In Lawrencc v. Miller the court said:
"The defendant came by it rightfully, in pursuance of a contract
lawfully made, between competent parties. He has failed in no
-R.C.M. 1947, § 45-112: "All contracts for the forfeiture of property subject to a
lien, in satisfaction of the obligation secured thereby, and all contracts in restraint
of the right of redemption are void."
'Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 133 Pac. 694 (1913).2
1R.C.M. 1947. § 13-804: "Every contract by which the amount of damage to be paid,
or other compensation to be made, for a breach of an obligation, is determined in
anticipation thereof, is to that extent void except as expressly provided in the next
section."
'-'Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 133 Pac. 694 (1913). The defendant
vendee was allowed recovery where there was waiver of performance by the vendor
and reliance thereon gave rise to estoppel. The court said that in the absence of an
equitable showing, a defaulting purchaser is not entitled to the return of his ad-
vance payments even though there was no provision for liquidated damages in the
contract.
28Edwards v. Muri, 73 Mont. 339, 237 Pac. 209 (1925). The purchaser under a land
purchase contract had paid taxes fon one year only and had been in possession for
two years. He had paid $193.00 of $6,170.00 price.' In holding for the vendor the
court said that he could not recover for unpaid installments due but could keep
those paid upon terminating the contract.
'Edwards v. Muri, 73 Mont. 339, 237 Pac. 209 (1925) ; Clark v. American Develop-
ment and Mining Co., 28 Mont. 468, 72 Pac. 978 (1903). In the latter a defaulting
vendee was held not entitled to a return of payments made under an installment
contract for the sale of land. The case followed a strict contract theory. $83,000.00
worth of ore was removed and $165,000.00 paid on price of $500,000.00. No showing
was made of any net benefit to the vendor.
-86 N.Y. 131 (1881). This case is still the law in New York. N.Y. Law Revision
Commission, op. cit. supra note 1, at 366.
IN. Y. Law Revision Commission, op. cit. supra note 36 at 343.
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duty to the vendee. Wherefore, then, should he give up that which
was rightfully his own? When and whereby did it cease to be his
and to be due to the vendee? If the contract had been kept by both
parties, the money paid would still be his of right. . . . To allow
a recovery of -this money would be to sustain an action by a party
on his own breach of his own contract, which the law does not al-
low ... ; to maintain this action would be to declare that a party
may violate his agreement, and make an infraction of it by himself
a cause of action. That would be ill doctrine."'
It is submitted that the court missed the point, which is that the pay-
ments were made under the terms of the contract in exchange for the prop-
erty. Upon default, the primary performance anticipated is breached and
the buyer is to lose the property to the seller. When the expected perform-
ance fails, the seller should not receive both the money due for perform-
ance and the property because of non-performance.
Professor Ballentine has also given an answer to the reasoning of this
case which has been characterized as representative of the prevailing view
among legal scholars. He wrote:
"Just as the law refuses to individuals the remedy of seeking
redress by self-help without resort to the courts, so it should regu-
late the remedies which they provide for themselves to enforce
their contracts, not only by refusing to enforce them, but also by
relieving against unconscionable and ruinous exactions in the na-
ture of penalties and forfeitures.''
The early Montana cases also relied on Glock v. Howard & Wilson
Colony Company, which is the leading California case allowing strict for-
feiture.' As would be expected under a strict forfeiture rule, the Glock
case gave rise to a plethora of cases creating exceptions to the harsh rule.'
The rule of the Glock case in California was circumvented and modified"
and finally, in 1951, was all but overruled by Freedman v. The Rector.'
The Freedman case holds that even a willfully defaulting vendee may re-
cover that portion of the down payment which is in excess of the vendor's
damages. This decision and the decision in the Barkis case" establish a
rule in California, under statutes identical to those in Montana, which align
properly the vendor-purchaser cases with the mortgagor-mortgagee cases
and with the modern trend.
In the Montana cases there has been no distinction made between situa-
tions where the purchaser was in possession and where he was not in pos-
session.' On principle, it is submitted that there is no need to distinguish
3'Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131, 140 (1881).
'Ballentine, supra note 5, at 352.
'123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898).
'Annot., 31 A.L.R. 2d 8 (1953) ; Pound, Tho. Progress of the Law: Equity, 33 HARV.
L. REv. 929 (1920).
"E.g., Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949). See Comment, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 235 (1949).
137 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1951).
"Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
'Yellowstone County v. Wight, 115 Mont. 411, 145 P.2d 516 (1943). The vendee was
not in possession and the court made a sweeping decree in his favor.
[Vol. 19,
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in this manner when relief is allowed on the grounds that the vendor would
be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the payments in excess of his
actual damages. Improvements have been treated in the same way as
cash payments so that the vendor has been allowed to keep the improve-
ments where forfeiture was allowed and he had no actual notice of the im-
provements.
In the cases generally, and in the Montana cases specifically, there has
not been any distinction based on the amount to be forfeited. Indirectly,
however, by finding waiver or rescission or other grounds the courts have
generally avoided unconscionable results. In only one Montana case' was
the vendor allowed to retain, as forfeited, an amount grossly in excess of
his damages. That case might be distinguished on the ground that the
plaintiff sought there, in effect, a rescission for misrepresentation in which
he had acquiesced for almost ten years. The court held that his complaint
did not state a cause of action.
It is submitted that since California has repudiated the Glock case and
achieved what seem to be equitable results in the Barkis and Freedman
cases, under the same statutes as exist in Montana, it should not be difficult
for Montana to achieve the same results. There has been only one case' in-
volving a forfeiture under a land purchase contract in Montana since the
Herman case in 1949, and that one involved a void parol contract for the
sale of land and is explainable on that ground alone.
In view of the foregoing analysis it appears that there are two possible
solutions to the defaulting purchasers predicament in Montana where the
amount sought to be forfeited is grossly in excess of the vendor's damages.
First, if he can plead and prove "facts that appeal to the conscience of a
court of equity," as that requirement has been defined by the Montana
court, he can recover under the above mentioned statute authorizing gen-
eral relief against forfeitures.' Second, the defaulting vendee may at-
tempt to avoid forfeiture of his payments in excess of the vendors damages
on the authority of the Freedman case, in which the California court grant-
ed relief on the basis of statutes identical to those of Montana.
RICHARD K. JACOBY.
8Estabrook v. Sonstelie, 86 Mont. 435, 284 Pac. 147 (1930).
"Lewis v. Peterson, 127 Mont. 474, 267 P.2d 127 (1953).
'
0R.C.M. 1947, § 17-102.
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